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The long awaited unification of mortgage regulation in March 2016 turned out to be little 
more than a damp squib. Those hoping that the ‘overtly borrower friendly ethos’1 of the 
Consumer Credit Act 1974 (CCA 1974) would be extended to all mortgagors will have been 
disappointed at the loss of the ‘unfair relationships test’2 and the reduction in the remedies 
available to mortgagors.3 This article, however, offers a glimmer of hope to campaigners and 
mortgagors alike by identifying an (as yet unnoticed and perhaps unintended) opportunity for 
a seismic shift in the way possession cases are handled in the County Courts. This shift 
involves the replacement of the narrow ‘affordability’ test applied under the Administration 
of Justice Act 1970 (AJA 1970) with the more flexible and ‘consumerist’ approach offered by 
the time order process under the CCA 1974. There are, however, a number of hurdles that 
stand in the way, not least of which is lack of knowledge regarding the time order process4 
and reticence on the part of the judiciary to ‘unleash the full potential’5 of the CCA 1974. It is 
the aim of this article to demonstrate how those hurdles might be overcome and, perhaps 
more importantly, to justify why that should be so. 
 
                                                          
1 L. McMurtry, ‘Consumer Credit Act Mortgages: Unfair Terms, Time Orders and Judicial Discretion’, (2010) 
Journal of Business Law 107, 122. 
2 Consumer Credit Act 1974, ss 140A-140C. See Money Advice Trust, Consultation Response: FCA Review of 
Retained Provisions of the CCA, (May 2016) 4, 5 and S. Nield, ‘Responsible Lending and Borrowing: Whereto 
Low-Cost Home Ownership?’ (2010) 30 Legal Studies 610, 615-616. 
3 For an account of the remedies available to the mortgagor under the previous two regimes see Nield, n 2 
above, 613-616. 
4 As Lord Bingham noted, “Where problems arise in practice, it appears to be because borrowers do not know of 
the effect of sections 129 and 136; neither the procedure for giving notice of default to the borrower nor the 
prescribed county court forms draw attention to them; and judgments will routinely be entered in the county 
court without the court considering whether to exercise its power under the sections” Director General of Fair 
Trading v First National Bank [2001] UKHL 52 [23]. 
5 McMurtry, n 1 above, 122. 
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The rejection of the AJA 1970 in favour of the CCA 1974 is justified on two grounds. The 
first is that such a move will replace the blunt tool offered by the AJA 1970 with a more 
nuanced process that recognises and responds to the differing levels of ‘risk’6 and 
‘resilience’7 experienced by the parties to the claim. The second is that it has the potential to 
realign the inherently unequal relationship between creditor and debtor8 by allowing for the 
consideration of the unique and potentially significant consequences arising from loss of 
‘home’9. Previous attempts to propose alternatives to the AJA 1970 process have been 
thwarted by what Bright describes as the ‘difficulty of weighing incommensurable 
interests.’10 Non-economic concerns arising from loss of home including the impact on the 
health and wellbeing11 of the household concerned and the community around them12 are 
difficult to quantify and hence to weigh against the economic concerns of the mortgagee, 
‘economic interests are readily quantifiable and the tools for measurement are well 
                                                          
6 For a detailed account of risk, particularly within debates regarding the regulation of the financial services 
industry, see L. Fox O’Mahony, Home Equity and Ageing Owners: Between Risk and Regulation (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2012), chapter 3. 
7 M. Bollig, ‘Resilience – Analytical Tool, Bridging Concept or Development Goal? Anthropological 
Perspectives on the Use of a Border Concept’ (2014) 139 Zeitschrift fur Ethnologie 253, M. De Bruijne, A. Boin 
and M. Van Eeten, ‘Resilience: Exploring the Concept and its Meanings’ in L. K. Comfort, A. Boin and C. C. 
Demchak (eds) Designing Resilience: Preparing for Extreme Events (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 
2010) 13, and M. Lotz, ‘Vulnerability and resilience: a critical nexus’, (2016) 37 Theor Med Bioeth 45. 
8 M.A. Fineman, ‘Fineman on Vulnerability and Law’ (November 30, 2015) New Legal Realism Conversations: 
Seeking to develop a rigorous, genuinely interdisciplinary approach to the empirical study of law at 
https://newlegalrealism.wordpress.com/2015/11/ (last visited 7 May 2019). 
9 See, for example, S. J. Bright, ‘Dispossession for Arrears: The Weight of Home in English Law’ in L. Fox 
O’Mahony and J. A. Sweeney (eds.), The Idea of Home in law: Displacement and Dispossession (London: 
Ashgate, 2011); L. Fox, Conceptualising Home: Theories, Law and Policies (Oxford: Hart, 2007); and L. Fox 
O’Mahony and J.A. Sweeney, ‘Re-thinking Responses to Displacement and Dispossession’ in L. Fox 
O’Mahony and J.A. Sweeney (eds), The Idea of Home in Law: Displacement and Dispossession (Surrey: 
Ashgate, 2011), 223. 
10 Bright, n 9 above, 39. See also Re Citro [1991] Ch 142, 150 per Hoffman J. 
11 See, for example, K. Libman, D. Fields and S. Saegert, ‘Housing and Health: A Social Ecological Perspective 
on the US Foreclosure Crisis’ (2012) 29.1 Housing, Theory and Society 1 and S. Nettleton and R. Burrows, 
‘When a Capital Investment Becomes an Emotional Loss: The Health Consequences of the Experience of 
Mortgage Possession in England’ (2000) 15:3 Housing Studies 463. 
12 Repossessions have the potential to impact on the local community, in terms of reducing property values and 
increasing crime levels, see R. Waldron & D. Redmond, ‘Stress in Suburbia: Counting the Costs of Ireland’s 




established. The same cannot be said of social interests. Social measures involve contested 
value judgments and are not as readily given to quantitative assessment.’13  
 
While social factors may be difficult to quantify, any attempt to put a price on the social 
aspects of loss of home has been eschewed by the AJA 1970. In focusing solely on the 
mortgagor’s ability to repay any sums due within a reasonable period it avoids any attempt to 
measure what is truly valuable, valuing instead only that which is measurable. Such an 
approach will be unremarkable to the land lawyer familiar with the ‘strict logic’14 of property 
law and its pursuit of the ‘mechanical and morally neutral operation of logical deduction.’15 
Critics, however, argue that it does not necessarily lead to ‘neutral’ decision making. Rather, 
it rather reinforces and upholds the ‘presumptive power of ownership’.16 The CCA 1974 
process, however, with its focus on what the court considers ‘just’, does not exclude the 
consideration of interests beyond the economic. Therefore, by allowing the judge to weigh 
both social and economic interests in determining the question of possession, the CCA 1974 
has the potential to solve the apparently insurmountable problem of making the divergent 
interests of the parties commensurate. 
 
In defence of these claims, this article begins with an account of the regulatory changes 
implemented in recent years and the impact on the enforcement processes available in respect 
of (what were previously known as) first and second mortgages. In highlighting the apparent 
choice now available between the AJA 1970 and the CCA 1974, the second section makes 
                                                          
13 Bright, n 9 above, 39. 
14 See K. Gray & S.F. Gray, ‘The Rhetoric of Realty,’ in J. Getzler, ed., Rationalizing Property, Equity and 
Trusts: Essays in Honour of Edward Burn (London: LexisNexis, 2003) and Fox O’Mahony, n 6 above, 100. 
15 Gray and Gray, n 14 above, 216. 
16 L.S. Underkuffler, The Idea of Property: Its Meaning and Power (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) 
and A.J. van der Walt, ‘Housing Rights in the Intersection between Expropriation and Eviction Law’ in L. Fox 




the case for the adoption of the latter by highlighting the disparity in the social and economic 
risks faced by the parties to the possession claim and their resilience in coping with them. 
The third section evaluates, through the use of a case study in the form of Green v Southern 
Pacific Mortgage Ltd,17 the extent to which the practical operation of the AJA 1970 and the 
CCA 1974 recognise and address this imbalance. The article concludes by arguing that the 
weight of evidence in favour of the CCA 1974 process suggests that we are duty bound to 
choose this path. 
 
A. The unified regulatory regime and its implications 
 
In March 2016 the UK government transferred second mortgages from the ‘protective 
confines’18 of the consumer credit framework to the regime covered by the Financial Services 
and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA 2000). The previous ‘awkward regulatory split’19 between 
‘first’ and ‘second’ mortgages became untenable following the implementation of the 
Mortgage Credit Directive (MCD)20 which had to be applied equally to both. As a result, the 
government reclassified second mortgages as ‘regulated mortgage contracts’ (RMCs)21 
thereby ‘switching off’22 many of the provisions of the CCA 1974 and making them instead 
                                                          
17 [2018] EWCA Civ 854. Particular focus will be given to the County Court judgment of Ms Recorder 
Rowlands, see Southern Pacific Mortgage Limited v Jacqueline Vera Green 2015 WL 7692940. 
18 L. Whitehouse, ‘The First Legal Mortgagor: A Consumer Without Adequate Protection?’ (2015) 38.2 Journal 
of Consumer Policy 161, 162. 
19 D. Cowan, Housing Law & Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011) 45. 
20 Mortgage Credit Directive on credit agreements for consumers relating to residential immovable property 
(2014/17/EU). 
21 Defined in FCA’s Perimeter Guidance Manual 4.4 at 
https://www.handbook.fca.org.uk/handbook/PERG/4/4.html (last visited 7 May 2019). Article 2(18) of the 
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) (Amendment) Order 2016 amends article 61(3) 
of the FSMA 2000 (Regulated Activities) Order 2001 so as to include contracts that were regulated credit 
agreements immediately before 21st March 2016. 
22 FCA, Implementation of the Mortgage Credit Directive and the new regime for second charge mortgages 
(London, Financial Conduct Authority, 2014) Consultation Paper CP14/20, Annexe 1, para. 59. 
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subject to the FSMA 2000 and the Mortgages and Home Finance Conduct of Business 
Sourcebook (MCOB).  
 
While the unification and consequent simplification of mortgage regulation will be welcomed 
by many,23 others, particularly those who have for many years called for first mortgagors to 
receive the same level of consumer protection as second mortgagors, are likely to consider 
this a perverse move.24 Such an interpretation is supported by the fact that the government 
implemented the MCD, a measure intended to enhance consumer protection within mortgage 
markets across Europe, by removing the ‘unfair relationships’ provisions in ss. 140A-C of the 
CCA 1974 (which no longer apply to second mortgages by virtue of their classification as 
RMCs).25 
 
Concerns have also been raised regarding the reduction in the remedies available to 
consumers.26 Under the new regime, second mortgagors can no longer seek direct action 
under the CCA 1974 but rather must now rely on a complaint to the Financial Ombudsman 
Service (FOS) or a private action for damages under the FSMA 2000. Similarly, under 
MCOB (as opposed to the CCA 1974), there is ‘no explicit role... provided for the court as 
part of its protective jurisdiction to deny possession to a mortgagee on the basis of breach of 
                                                          
23 See, for example, Law Commission, Transfer of Land – Land Mortgages, Law Com 204 (1991) and 
McMurtry, n 1 above. 
24 See, for example, M. T. Partington, ‘Citizenship and Housing’ in R. Blackburn (ed), Rights of Citizenship 
(London: Mansell, 1993), A. Stewart, Rethinking Housing Law (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1996), 268-275, 
and Whitehouse, n 18 above. 
25 s. 140A(5) of the CCA 1974 makes it clear that the unfair relationships test does not apply to RMCs. Also, by 
virtue of s. 16(6C) of the CCA 1974 (inserted by the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated 
Activities) Order 2001, now replaced by s. 60C(2) FSMA 2000), regulated mortgage agreements are exempt 
from the vast majority of the provisions of the CCA 1974. See, for example, S. Brown, ‘The Consumer Credit 
Act 2006; Real Additional Mortgagor Protection’ (Jul/Aug 2007) Conv 316, 329; A. Burrows, English Private 
Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013) para. 5.33; and M. Dixon, Modern Land Law (Abingdon: 
Routledge, 2014) 438. For concerns about these changes see Money Advice Trust, n 2 above, 5 and Nield, n 2 
above, 615-616. 




MCOB alone.’27 These moves have been criticised by the Money Advice Trust28 and Nield 
who noted at the time these reforms were mooted that, ‘… in an exercise which is intended to 
curb irresponsible lending, it is counterproductive to remove protective measures which could 
have real consequences for an abused mortgagor.’29 It seems, however, that all mortgagors 
will now be reliant upon FOS, MCOB and the effective enforcement of it by the Financial 
Conduct Authority (FCA). 
 
In response to these concerns, the FCA and the Treasury have sought to offer reassurance by 
claiming that MCOB offers adequate protection for those in payment difficulties and that 
some measures available under the CCA 1974, such as time orders, remain available.30 The 
Treasury confirmed also that time orders do (and apparently always did)31 apply to what were 
previously known as first mortgages,32 a revelation that many might find surprising.33  
 
While it seems clear that the ‘unfair relationships’ test has been lost and that time orders 
continue to apply to all mortgages, what has not yet been clarified is the question regarding 
which process should be used when a mortgagee seeks possession under a RMC. Prior to 
these reforms, a clear distinction existed. Acquisition or first legal mortgages were dealt with 
under the AJA 1970 whereas second mortgages, due to their explicit exclusion from the AJA 
1970,34 were dealt with under the CCA 1974. The reclassification of second mortgages as 
                                                          
27 McMurtry, n 1 above, 124. 
28 Money Advice Trust, n 2 above, 5. 
29 Nield, n 2 above, 615-616. 
30 FCA, n 22 above, Annexe 1, para. 59. 
31 Rosenberg notes that some may be surprised at this, see R. Rosenberg ‘Call Time on Time Orders?’, (Spring 
2016) Quarterly Account 18, 19. 
32 Treasury Consultation, ‘Implementation of the EU Mortgage Credit Directive’ (January 2015), section 2.3 at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/implementation-of-the-eu-mortgage-credit-
directive/implementation-of-the-eu-mortgage-credit-directive (last visited 7 May 2019). See also FCA’s 
Perimeter Guidance Manual, n 21 above, 4.17.2 PERG.  
33 Rosenberg n 31 above, 19. 
34 Administration of Justice Act, s 38A excludes regulated agreements within the meaning of the Consumer 
Credit Act 1974. 
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RMCs now brings them within the boundaries of the AJA 1970 but, the time order process 
under the CCA 1974 also remains open to RMCs. The question therefore is, which process 
should be used and under what circumstances? Additionally and perhaps more importantly, 
which process should be preferred? The answer to these questions has the potential to impact 
significantly on mortgagors at risk of losing their home. 
 
With the law of mortgage at an apparent crossroads, the next section of this article, in an 
attempt to inform and persuade reformers and practitioners as to which path to choose, 
evaluates the social and economic risks associated with loss of home for both the mortgagor 
and mortgagee and their resilience in coping with them. The argument, put simply, is that if 
significant inequality exists in the position of the parties to the possession claim, then we are 
duty bound to choose the path that most effectively remedies such ‘structural privilege and 
disadvantage.’35 In pursuit of this claim, the next section begins with a brief exploration of 




While resilience is a term as ‘ubiquitous’36 and pliable as vulnerability (a term often 
associated with it) if left undefined,37 it is beyond the confines of this article to offer an in-
depth analysis of it. Suffice to say that it relates to ‘having some means with which to address 
and confront misfortune’38 or, as Lotz puts it, ‘a capacity to confront, absorb, withstand, 
accommodate, reconcile, and/or adjust to conditions of adversity, setback, and challenge...’.39 
                                                          
35 Fineman, n 8 above. 
36 D. Chandler, Resilience: The Governance of Complexity (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014), 2. 
37 De Bruijne, Boin and Van Eeten, n 7 above, 14. 
38 M.A. Fineman, ‘The Vulnerable Subject and the Responsive State’ (2010) 60 Emory L.J. 251, 269. 
39 Lotz, n 7 above, 50. 
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Fineman’s substantial analysis of the concept reveals that resilience is ‘not something we are 
born with’40 but rather is ‘accrued over the course of our lifetimes within an array of social 
structures and institutions over which individuals may have little, if any control.’41 This is 
important for it suggests that our resilience in coping with adversity is influenced by both 
internal and external factors and can be weakened or bolstered by our interaction with other 
individuals and institutions. Our attention therefore must not only be on the internal resilience 
of mortgagors, but also on how their resilience is affected by external factors, including the 
operation of societal norms and processes including the legal process of possession, for as 
Fineman notes, ‘...  resilience is produced within and through institutions and relationships 
that confer privilege and power. Those institutions and relationships, whether deemed public 
or private, are at least partially defined and reinforced by law.’42 
 
In an effort to avoid the pitfalls associated with classifying individuals or groups as 
‘vulnerable’,43 Fineman’s assertion is that while we are all vulnerable, we each ‘experience 
the world with differing levels of resilience.’44 This is important for it avoids the stigma of 
particular groups or individuals with particular characteristics being classified as ‘them’ 
rather than ‘us’.45 The different regulatory treatment previously afforded to second 
mortgagors, for example, was justified on the basis that they were deserving of ‘special 
protection’46 under the CCA 1974 as a result of their vulnerability to high pressure 
                                                          
40 M. A. Fineman, ‘Vulnerability, Resilience, and LGBT Youth’ (2014) 23 Temp. Pol. & Civ. Rts. L. Rev. 307, 
320. 
41 M. A. Fineman, ‘Equality and Difference – The Restrained State’ (2015) 66 Ala. L. Rev. 609, 623. 
42 Fineman, n 8 above. 
43 Concerns regarding the labelling of individuals as ‘vulnerable’ are well known, see Fox O’Mahony, n 6 
above, chapter 3. 
44 Fineman, n 8 above. 
45 P. Cartwright, ‘Understanding and Protecting Vulnerable Financial Consumers’ (2015) 38 Journal of 
Consumer Policy 119, 120. See also FCA, Consumer Vulnerability (February 2015) Occasional Paper No. 8, 17.  
46 Committee on Consumer Credit, ‘Consumer Credit: Report of the Committee’ (Cmnd 4596, 1971), para. 1.1.6 
and Brown, n 25 above, 318. 
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salesmanship within the second mortgage market.47 As the Financial Services Panel notes, 
however, it is ‘unrealistic and, arguably, patronising’48 to assume that consumers experience 
markets in the same way, or that first mortgagors would not be open to similar forms of 
exploitation.  
 
It follows therefore that is not the role of the state to introduce provisions targeted at those 
characterised as ‘vulnerable’ but rather to ensure that institutions such as the legal system 
recognise the degree of resilience individuals enjoy in coping with inevitable harms. In other 
words, it is not sufficient for first and second mortgages to be integrated under a unified 
regime of regulation if that regime fails to recognise and respond to the differing levels of 
resilience of each and every mortgagor and mortgagee. It seems reasonable to suggest that it 
would be considered unfair, for example, for a mortgagor who has been subject to illness, 
bereavement, mental health issues or the unethical behaviour of their mortgagee to be 
assessed under the same criterion of ‘affordability’ as a mortgagor who has not been subject 
to such factors. In an effort to assess which of the two approaches available to the judiciary, 
namely the AJA 1970 and the CCA 1974, best recognises and responds to the level (or lack) 
of resilience enjoyed by the parties, the following section identifies the potential harms faced 
by the mortgagee and the mortgagor (whether under a first or second mortgage), their 
capacity to cope with them and, any disparity therein. 
 
B. Risks and consequences: the mortgagee 
 
                                                          
47 McMurtry, n 1 above, 109. See also See FCA, n 22 above, para. 1.13; K. Gray and S. F. Gray, Elements of 
Land Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 736; and Money Advice Trust, n 2 above, 4. 




The mortgagee’s susceptibility to risk within the possession process takes two forms, 
economic and reputational. The financial crisis of 2008 serves as evidence of the economic 
impairment that mortgagees can suffer as a result of mortgage default. The reasons 
underlying that crisis are complex but a combination of lenders’ willingness to extend 
mortgage finance to lower-income households and to accept ‘greater levels of lending risk to 
achieve higher profits’49 alongside the securitisation of mortgage debt resulted in catastrophic 
consequences for the mortgage industry in the US, UK and Ireland.50  
 
Under less dramatic circumstances, the possession process has the potential to leave the 
mortgagee with unpaid loans. Statistics produced by the Bank of England indicate that in the 
fourth quarter of 2018, the value of outstanding balances with some arrears amounted to 
£14.4 billion, 1% of total balances.51 Figures on the number of repossessed properties that are 
sold are difficult to find but the Bank of England indicated that in third quarter of 2016, 4,086 
repossessed properties remained on mortgagees’ books.52 The sale of repossessed properties 
is, of course, designed to recoup the money owed to the mortgagee but there is the potential 
for the property to be sold at a price less than the outstanding mortgage debt. Evidence 
indicates, for example, that between 2008-2013, 87 per cent of properties taken into 
possession were sold at a loss compared with only 34 per cent prior to 2008.53 Obviously any 
shortfall in sale price is not irrecoverable for a mortgagee is entitled to pursue the mortgagor 
for any amount outstanding after possession and sale for up to 12 years after the right to 
                                                          
49 Waldron and Redmond, n 12 above, 484. 
50 In Ireland, for example, the result was a ‘mortgage arrears crisis’ which gave rise to €2.4bn outstanding in 
mortgage arrears payments by 2014, ibid 485. 
51 Bank of England, ‘Mortgage Lenders and Administrators Statistics for 2018 Q4’ (12 March 2019), available 
at https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/statistics/mortgage-lenders-and-administrators/2018/2018-q4. 
52 Bank of England, ‘Mortgage Lenders and Administrators Statistics for 2016 Q3’ (13 December 2016), 
available at https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/statistics/mortgage-lenders-and-administrators/2016/2016-q3 
53 FitchRatings, ‘Peak Vintage Originations Drive Higher UK Loss Severities’ (28 March 2013) at 
https://www.fitchratings.com/gws/en/fitchwire/fitchwirearticle/Peak-Vintage-Originations?pr_id=787118 (last 
visited 7 May 2019). 
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receive the money accrued54 but there are costs associated with doing so and a mortgagor 
may be unable to pay in any event. The extent to which mortgagees go on to recover such 
losses from the mortgagor is not known. 
 
The other major source of potential impairment arising out of the possession process for the 
mortgagee is loss of reputation. Reputational risk ‘is the potential that negative publicity 
regarding an institution’s business practices, whether true or not, will cause a decline in the 
customer base, costly litigation, or revenue reductions.’55 It is to be assumed that a mortgagee 
who fails to treat their customers fairly or who undertakes a disproportionate number of 
possessions may suffer from negative publicity or a decline in customer base.56 As Brown 
notes, however, ‘while it is a defined risk, reputational risk is often difficult to identify and 
quantify’57 which accounts, in part perhaps, for the lack of attention many financial 
institutions paid to the issue prior to 2008.58 There are examples, however, of where 
otherwise reputable lenders have suffered negative publicity as a result of their handling of 
mortgage default. Yorkshire Building Society, for example, was fined £4.1m by the FCA in 
2014 for failing to deal with customers in default in an appropriate and prompt manner59 and 
this was covered in a range of media outlets.60 In addition, research by Armour et al suggests 
that the reputational damage caused by such sanctions can be on average nine times larger 
                                                          
54 Limitation Act 1980, s 20. 
55 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Commercial Bank Examination Manual (April 2016) 4, 7. 
56 Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, ‘Safety and Soundness: Mortgage Banking’ (Washington D.C., 
February 2014). 
57 W. J. Brown, ‘Understanding Reputational Risk: Identify, Measure, and Mitigate the Risk’ (2007) SRC 
Insights. 
58 T. Squires, ‘Banking On a Reputation’ (6 February 2011) Financial Risks Today, at 
http://www.financialriskstoday.com/reputation_june.php (last visited 7 May 2019). 
59 FCA, ‘FCA fines Yorkshire Building Society £4,135,600 for failings in dealing with customers in mortgage 
arrears’ (29 October 2014) Press Releases. 
60 See, for example, BBC, ‘Yorkshire Building Society fined £4.1m over mortgages’ (29 October 2014) BBC 
Business website, at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-29817714 (last visited 7 May 2019) and S. Farrell, 
‘Yorkshire Building Society fined £4m for unfair treatment of borrowers’ (29 October 2014) The Guardian, at 




than the financial penalties imposed by the regulator.61 To this extent, therefore, reputational 
risk is of concern to mortgagees for the reason that it can lead to financial loss hence all risks 
faced by a mortgagee are, in practice, economic. 
 
C. The ‘resilience’ of the mortgagee 
 
As regards the ability of mortgagees to counter the risk of economic and reputational loss, the 
regulatory framework and state funded bailouts offer significant support. By virtue of the 
First Pillar of the Basel II Accord, for example, lenders are obliged to maintain minimum 
capital levels in order to enable them to absorb any losses arising from credit risks such as 
mortgagors defaulting on their loans.62 The economic vulnerability of mortgagees is therefore 
constrained to the extent that the risk lies in reduced profits rather than insolvency.63 It seems 
also that at times of particular crisis financial institutions have access to a safety net in the 
form of bailout loans from the state, ‘consider how the state responded to the increasingly 
vulnerable position of certain big businesses caused by the failing market during the 
recession. Their heightened vulnerability was met with loans to the auto industry and bailouts 
for the financial industry.’64 During times of greater economic stability, however, it should be 
noted that arrears and repossessions constitute a tiny percentage of mortgage business. Of the 
                                                          
61 J. Armour, C. Mayer and A. Polo, ‘Regulatory Sanctions and Reputational Damage in Financial Markets’ 
(2010) Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No. 62/2010, 3. 
62 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, ‘International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital 
Standards’ (June 2006), Part 2. See M. Leow and C. Mues, ‘The economy and loss given default: evidence from 
two UK retail lending data sets’ (2014) 65.3 Journal of the Operational Research Society 363, 375. 
63 M. Leow and C. Mues, ‘The economy and loss given default: evidence from two UK retail lending data sets’ 
(2014) 65.3 Journal of the Operational Research Society 363, 375. 
64 M.A. Fineman, ‘Equality, Autonomy, and the Vulnerable Subject in Law and Politics’ in M.A. Fineman and 




9 million mortgaged properties in the UK, only 0.86 per cent were in arrears over 2.5% of the 
outstanding balance in the fourth quarter of 2018.65 
 
As regards reputational risk, this is significantly reduced by the fact that information 
regarding the arrears management practices of individual mortgage lenders is not made 
publicly available.66 It is difficult to know, therefore, whether some mortgagees undertake 
more possession actions than others. While mortgagees are exposed to economic risk factors, 
therefore, their resilience is strong. 
 
B. Risks and consequences: the mortgagor 
 
For some mortgagors, the potential harm arising out of the possession process may manifest 
itself in the form of economic loss, such as in the case of the possession of investment 
properties. For others, loss of home may impact adversely on their health, creditworthiness 
and status.67 Libman et al, for example, note that losing a home ‘represents a significant 
disruption to the ontological security of homeowners and their families as it is afforded by... 
the home as a site of refuge and control.’68 This may explain, in part, the adverse impact that 
the possession process can have on the physical and mental health of some mortgagors.69 The 
Royal College of Psychiatrists, for example, suggest that the impact of mortgage debt can 
                                                          
65 UK Finance, ‘Mortgage Arrears and Possessions Update Quarter 4 2018’, (14 February 2019), available at 
https://www.ukfinance.org.uk/data-and-research/data/mortgages/arrears-and-possessions. 
66 See, for example, Whitehouse, n 18 above, M. Leow and C. Mues, ‘Predicting loss given default (LGD) for 
residential mortgage loans: A two-stage model and empirical evidence for UK bank data’ (2012) 28 
International Journal of Forecasting 183, 184, J. Aron and J. Muelbauer, ‘Modelling and forecasting mortgage 
delinquency and foreclosure in the UK’ (2016) 94 Journal of Urban Economics 32, 32. 
67 See S. Nettleton, J. England, R. Burrows and J. Seavers, ‘The social consequences of mortgage repossession 
for parents and their children’ (Joseph Rowntree Foundation, August 1999) and Nettleton and Burrows, n 11 
above. 
68 Libman, Fields and Saegert, n 11 above, 6-7. 
69 Nettleton and Burrows, n 11 above, 478. See also S. Nettleton and R. Burrows, ‘Families Coping with the 
Experience of Mortgage Repossession in the “New Landscape of Precariousness”’ (2001) 4:3 Community, Work 
& Family 253. 
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include, ‘a negative impact on personal identity, invoking uncertainty and impacting on a 
sense of self; heightened levels of uncertainty; and feelings of stigma, shame and 
biographical disruption.’70 These impacts can also extend to the family of the mortgagor. 
Nettleton’s interviews with children who have experienced repossession, for example, 
highlight several issues of concern for them including uncertainty, worry and lack of 
control.71  
 
Lack of control is also evident in the causes underlying the threat of possession. In essence, a 
mortgagor can lose their home not through fecklessness but as a result of ‘social force 
majeure’.72 Circumstances prevalent at the current time, including a combination of labour 
market flexibility,73 job insecurity,74 a reduction in social welfare provision,75 and reduced 
access to legal advice,76 have given rise to what Forrest describes as a ‘landscape of 
precariousness’77 in which individuals, regardless of age or status, are capable of falling into 
debt. Within this landscape it takes only one or two ‘affordability shocks’ to impact 
significantly on a mortgagor’s ability to meet their mortgage payments.78  
                                                          
70 Royal College of Psychiatrists, ‘Debt and Mental Health: What Do We Know? What Should We Do?’ (2010) 
3, 8. 
71 S. Nettleton, ‘Losing a Home through Mortgage Repossession: The Views of Children’ (2001) 15 Children 
and Society 82, 92. 
72 T. Wilhelmsson, ‘‘Social Force Majeure’ – A New Concept in Nordic Consumer Law’ (1990) 13 Journal of 
Consumer Policy 1, 2. 
73 Y. McCarthy, Dis-entangling the mortgage arrears crisis: The role of the labour market, income volatility 
and housing equity, (Dublin: Central Bank of Ireland, 2014) 6, 13. 
74 StepChange, ‘Navigating the New Normal: Why Working Families Fall into Problem Debt and How We 
Need to Respond’ (December 2015), 34. See also Waldron and Redmond, n 12 above, 496. 
75 Nettleton and Burrows, n 69 above. 
76 The availability of early legal advice was significantly reduced by the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment 
of Offenders Act 2012. See, for example, M. Fouzder, ‘Society exposes “catastrophic” housing advice deserts’ 
(25 April 2019) The Law Society Gazette, available at https://www.lawgazette.co.uk/practice/society-exposes-
catastrophic-housing-advice-
deserts/5070051.article?utm_source=dispatch&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=%20GAZ141016 (last 
visited 7 May 2019). See also evidence from Citizens Advice Bureaux, Civil Justice Council and Shelter at 
http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/justice-
committee/inquiries/parliament-2010/laspo/?type=Written#pnlPublicationFilter (last visited 7 May 2019). 
77 R. Forrest, ‘The new landscape of precariousness’ in P. Kennett and A. Marsh (eds) Homelessness: Exploring 
the New Terrain (Bristol: Policy Press, 1999). 




C. The resilience of the mortgagor 
 
The factors noted above explain the harms that may arise for the mortgagor and their family 
as a result of loss of home and the reasons why they may find themselves susceptible to them. 
If we focus on resilience, however, the question becomes not simply whether mortgagors are 
subject to those risks but rather the extent to which they are able to ameliorate their effects. 
As StepChange note, for example, income shocks in and of themselves are unlikely to lead to 
problem debt if coupled with strong financial resilience.79 Figures in respect of the personal 
savings of home buyers, however, does not bode well for those trying to navigate the current 
‘landscape of precariousness’. The English Housing Survey found that 54 per cent of first 
time buyers had no savings and 19 per cent had less than £5000 in savings.80 
 
A mortgagor’s resilience in dealing with harm can also be bolstered or weakened by external 
factors including market conditions, the behaviour of firms, social welfare provision, 
regulation and access to advice. As Wallace notes, ‘the accrual or consequences of mortgage 
arrears are determined by the degree of social protection offered to people through a 
country’s welfare system and labour market and the regulation of the mortgage market.’81 In 
offering a detailed but concise account of the support offered to mortgagors in financial 
difficulty since the 1990s, she goes on to suggest, perhaps with a hint of understatement, that 
‘support for low-income mortgage borrowers suffering mortgage shocks has been weak for 
                                                          
79 StepChange, n 74 above, 10. 
80 Department for Communities and Local Government, ‘English Housing Survey: First Time Buyers and 
Potential Home Owners Report, 2014-15’, para 1.16, at https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/english-
housing-survey (last visited 7 May 2019). 
81 A. Wallace, ‘Homeowners and Poverty: A Literature Review’ (York: Joseph Rowntree Foundation, July 
2016) 32. See also, J. Ford and A. Wallace, ‘Mortgage default: consequences’ (2012) International 
Encyclopaedia of Housing and the Home, 346. 
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many years.’82 To summarise, the state has relied on a ‘variety pack’ of initiatives including 
state funded welfare, private insurance, regulatory measures, enhanced forbearance by 
lenders, mortgage rescue schemes and increased funding for ‘emergency’ advice services. 
The amount of support offered by the state has fluctuated in response to macro-economic 
factors including unprecedented levels of possessions during the early 1990s and the financial 
crisis of 2008. This is perhaps best demonstrated by the roller coaster ride of Support for 
Mortgage Interest (SMI) which has varied in terms of the waiting time for payments 
(originally eight weeks, then 39 weeks then 13 weeks and now back to 39 weeks), the 
recipient of the payment (switching from mortgagors to mortgagees in the mid-1990s) and 
the calculations used for arriving at the payment amount (moving from payment of the actual 
interest payable to a fixed amount in 1995).83  
 
There have been moves, however, to withdraw state support for mortgagors evidenced by the 
return in April 2016 to the 39 week waiting period for SMI and the transition in SMI from 
April 2018 from a benefit to an interest-bearing loan secured against the property.84 The 
impact of these and other measures, including the introduction of Universal Credit, is awaited 
but ‘given the substantial impact of policy interventions, it follows that withdrawal of such 
policy support would cause a serious deterioration in mortgage defaults unless offset by 
remarkably benign economic circumstances.’85 
 
                                                          
82 Wallace, n 81 above, 32. 
83 C. Murphy, S. Kennedy and R. Keen, ‘Support for Mortgage Interest (SMI) Scheme’ (House of Commons 
Library, Briefing Paper 06618, 3 May 2016), Wallace, n 81 above, 31, S. Wilcox and P. Williams, ‘Building an 
Effective Safety Net for Home Owners and the Housing Market: Unfinished Business’ (York: Joseph Rowntree 
Foundation, July 2013), 12. 
84 Welfare Reform and Work Act 2016, s 18. 
85 J. Aron and J. Muelbauer, ‘2014 Forecast Scenarios for UK Mortgage Arrears and Possessions’ (Department 
for Communities and Local Government, November 2014) 13. 
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As regards the regulation of the mortgage industry, RMCs created after 31 October 2004 are 
subject to regulation by the FCA86 which has overseen a long running change of emphasis in 
the regulation of mortgage providers. Based on a comprehensive review of the mortgage 
market known as the Mortgage Market Review (MMR), regulation has transitioned from the 
‘principled based approach’87 evident before the 2008 crisis to a ‘proportionate regulatory 
approach’.88 The latter has given rise to new responsible lending rules (which focus in 
particular on affordability checks),89 a number of ‘thematic reviews’90 and recently guidance 
on the treatment of customers with mortgage payment shortfalls.91  
 
As regards mortgagors in default, the FCA’s main regulatory instrument is MCOB which 
have been amended following the MMR.92 This requires that possession should be 
undertaken only ‘where all other reasonable attempts to resolve the position have failed’93 
and that the equivalent of at least two months’ arrears must have accumulated before court 
proceedings should be initiated.94 A similar layer of protection is afforded to mortgagors who 
took out their mortgage prior to October 2004 in the form of the ‘Pre-Action Protocol for 
Possession Claims Based on Mortgage or Home Purchase Plan Arrears in Respect of 
                                                          
86 Financial Services and Markets Act 2000. 
87 See, for example, J. Black, ‘The Rise, Fall and Fate of Principles Based Regulation’ (2010) LSE Law, Society 
and Economy Working Papers 17/2010. 
88 FCA, ‘The FCA’s approach to advancing its objectives 2015’ December 2015. 
89 Implemented in April 2014. See MCOB 11. 
90 FCA, ‘Embedding the Mortgage Market Review: Responsible Lending Review’ Thematic Review TR16/4, 
(May 2016); FCA, ‘Mortgage Lenders’ Arrears Management and Forbearance: Thematic Review’ (February 
2014) TR14/3; and FCA, ‘Vulnerability Exposed: The Consumer Experience of Vulnerability in Financial 
Services’ (December 2014). 
91 FCA, ‘GC16/6 - The fair treatment of mortgage customers in payment shortfall: impact of automatic 
capitalisations’ Guidance Consultation (October 2016); FCA, ‘FG17/4 - The fair treatment of mortgage 
customers in payment shortfall: impact of automatic capitalisations’ Finalised Guidance (April 2017); and FCA, 
‘TR18/5: Management of long-term mortgage arrears and forbearance’ Thematic Reviews (6 December 2018). 
92 See http://fshandbook.info/FS/html/FCA (last visited 7 May 2019). 
93 MCOB 13.3.2AR(6). 
94 The FCA defines ‘arrears’ as a shortfall equivalent to two or more regular payments in the accumulated total 
payments actually made by the borrower see FCA, Handbook – Glossary at 
https://www.handbook.fca.org.uk/handbook/glossary/?starts-with=A (last visited 7 May 2019). 
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Residential Property’ (the MPAP)95 which seeks to ensure that the parties ‘act fairly and 
reasonably’ with each other in addressing any concerns relating to the mortgage.96 Sanctions 
for non-compliance include an order to pay the costs of the proceedings and if the mortgagee 
is awarded a sum of money, an order depriving them of interest on that sum.97 Since the 
introduction of the MPAP, the number of claims made by mortgagees has dropped sharply, 
falling from 142,741 claims in 2008 to 19,507 in 2018.98 The role played by the Protocol in 
this decline is difficult to assess, as the Ministry of Justice indicates,  
 
The historical fall in the number of mortgage possession actions since 2008 coincides 
with lower interest rates, a proactive approach from lenders in managing consumers in 
financial difficulties and other interventions, such as the Mortgage Rescue Scheme 
and the introduction of the Mortgage Pre-Action Protocol.99 
 
Carr in particular is critical of the assistance that has been provided to mortgagors during 
times of turmoil including the MPAP which she argues is indicative of the state’s 
unwillingness to take responsibility for assisting marginal home owners.100 Support for Carr’s 
view is offered by a comparison between the £20 million package introduced in 2012 by the 
then coalition government to support struggling home owners and the £1,162 billion offered 
                                                          
95 See http://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-rules/civil/protocol/prot_mha (last visited 7 May 2019). 
MPAP repeats much of what is already contained in MCOB but it applies equally to all residential mortgages 
except ‘buy-to-let’ loans as these are regarded as commercial transactions , para 4.3. 
96 MPAP, para 2.1. 
97 Practice Direction – Pre-Action Conduct and Protocols, para 16. 
98 Ministry of Justice, ‘Mortgage and landlord possession statistical tables: October - December 2018’, Table 1. 
99 Ministry of Justice, ‘Mortgage and Landlord Possession Statistics in England and Wales, October to 
December 2018 (Provisional)’, (14 February 2019), 3. 
100 H. Carr, ‘Housing the Vulnerable Subject: The English Context’ in M.A. Fineman and A. Grear (eds) 
Vulnerability: Reflections on a New Ethical Foundation for Law and Politics (Surrey: Ashgate, 2013) 108, 116. 




to the banks following the 2008 crisis.101 As Fineman notes, in contrast to the bailout offered 
to the banks, ‘the heightened vulnerability of the individual mortgage holder created in the 
wake of the same crisis was ignored – his plight assigned to the realm of individual 
responsibility and the pleas for governmental aid deflected with cries of “moral hazard”.’102 
 
In combination, the light regulation of mortgagees, a lack of accessible legal and debt advice, 
exposure to inappropriate lending practices and poor social welfare provision means that the 
resilience of some mortgagors in avoiding the threat of loss of home is likely to be weak, 
particularly when compared to that enjoyed by the mortgagee.  
 
Having identified the significant imbalance in the resilience experienced by the parties to the 
possession claim, the following section evaluates the extent to which the practical operation 
of the AJA 1970 and the CCA 1974 recognises and addresses that disparity. It does so by 
offering two accounts of Southern Pacific Mortgage Limited v Jacqueline Vera Green.103 The 
first highlights the approach adopted within the possession process under s. 36 AJA 1970. 
The second assesses how that approach could have differed had the case been heard under the 
CCA 1974. The distinction, as will become apparent, is quite marked. 
 
The facts of Green104 will be revealed in full as these two accounts progress but it is perhaps 
worth noting at this stage that while one case is unlikely to give rise to credible 
                                                          
101 National Audit Office, ‘Taxpayer support for UK banks: FAQs’ at 
https://www.nao.org.uk/highlights/taxpayer-support-for-uk-banks-faqs/ (last visited 7 May 2019). 
102 Fineman, n 64 above, 25-26. 
103 WL 7692940 heard on 19 November 2015 by Ms Recorder Rowlands at Bristol County Court. On appeal at 
Green v Southern Pacific Mortgage Ltd & Anor [2018] EWCA Civ 854. 
104 ibid.  
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generalisations, this case is worthy of close scrutiny for three reasons. The first is that it is 
reflective of the majority of possession claims in that the mortgagee was claiming possession 
on the basis of mortgage arrears. The second is that part of the reasoning, at both County 
Court and Court of Appeal level, is based on a flawed assumption about the similarity 
between the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 (DDA 1995) and the Equality Act 2010 (EA 
2010). Finally, for a mortgage nerd (such as me) it is the equivalent of gold dust; the 
reporting of County Court decisions in housing possession cases being virtually unheard of. 
What this case offers us, therefore, is a tantalising insight into the ‘evidential black hole’105 of 
housing possession cases. 
 
B. The AJA 1970 in practice 
 
The aim of this section is not to offer a description of how the AJA 1970 process operates in 
practice, a task already completed in any event,106 but rather to examine whether it offers an 
adequate response to the imbalance evident in the resilience of the parties to the claim. The 
answer, as evidenced by the case of Green, is that it does not. As regards the facts of Green, 
the only features that are salient for the purposes of s. 36 of the AJA 1970 are that the 
mortgagee was entitled to seek possession by virtue of its inherent right to possession107 and 
that the equivalent of two months arrears had accrued (by the date of the County Court 
hearing, the mortgagee was claiming £181,703 in arrears and legal fees).108 Given the 
                                                          
105 I. Loveland, ‘Twenty years later - assessing the significance of the Human Rights Act 1998 to residential 
possession proceedings’ (2017) Conv 174, 190. 
106 S. Bright and L. Whitehouse, Information, Advice & Representation in Housing Possession Cases (April 
2014), 63, at https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/sites/files/oxlaw/housing_possession_report_april2014.pdf (last visited 7 
May 2019). 
107 See, for example, M. Conaglen, ‘Mortgagee Powers Rhetoric’ (2006) 69(4) MLR 583 and Four-Maids Ltd. v 
Dudley Marshall (Properties) Ltd [1957] Ch 317. 
108 Southern Pacific Mortgage Limited v Jacqueline Vera Green 2015 WL 7692940, para. 27. 
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mortgagee’s inherent right to possession, the mortgagor could not deny that the mortgagee 
was entitled to seek a possession order but she was able to request that the order be 
suspended under s. 36 of the AJA 1970. By virtue of this section, a judge has discretion to 
suspend an order for possession upon specified payment terms if, ‘it appears to the court that 
in the event of its exercising the power the borrower is likely to be able within a reasonable 
period to pay any sums due under the mortgage.’109 In considering whether to exercise this 
discretion, the judge held that, given the mortgagor’s financial position and inability to afford 
the contractual payments, it was not possible to suspend the possession order (other than to 
allow time for an appeal following the decision of the Supreme Court in a related case).110 
The mortgagor’s appeal was later rejected by the Court of Appeal.111  
 
The significance of this account, for the purposes of this article, lies in what it fails to reveal. 
The focus given to affordability within the AJA 1970 means that there is little if any room for 
assessing the reason for the arrears, the impact of losing the home,112 the behaviour of the 
parties, or other non-economic factors such as the mortgagor’s ‘personal home story’.113 As 
the following analysis reveals, however, issues of this kind were evident in this case and 
could (and arguably should) have been taken into consideration had this case been heard 
under the CCA 1974. 
 
B. The CCA 1974 in theory and practice 
                                                          
109 The term ‘any sums due’ applies only to the arrears outstanding at the time in addition to normal contractual 
payments, Administration of Justice Act 1973, s 8. 
110 McDonald v McDonald and others [2016] UKSC 28. 
111 Green v Southern Pacific Mortgage Ltd & Anor [2018] EWCA Civ 854. 
112 Fox O’Mahony and Sweeney, n 9 above, 223. For evidence of the impact possession can have see, for 
example, Libman, Fields and Saegert, n 11 above, and Nettleton and Burrows, n 11 above. 




By virtue of s. 129(2) of the CCA 1974, the court can, if it considers it just, order the debtor 
to pay ‘any sum owed under a regulated agreement… by such instalments, payable at such 
times, as the court, having regard to the means of the debtor… considers reasonable.’ In 
addition, the court may also, by virtue of s. 136 of the CCA 1974, tag on to a time order ‘such 
provision as it considers just for amending any agreement or security in consequence of a 
term of the order.’ Unfortunately, information relating to how these provisions are 
implemented in practice is scant with only two cases of any real note.114 A detailed account 
of these cases is not offered here for the reason that it is the potential that the CCA 1974 
offers, rather than the judiciary’s previous approach to it, that is significant for the purposes 
of this article.  
 
The difference between this and the AJA 1970 may at first appear to be relatively subtle. 
Under both, the court has discretion to effectively suspend possession provided the mortgagor 
keeps to the payments terms stipulated by the court. Neither provision is open to a mortgagor 
who does not currently have the means to repay at least some of what is owed115 hence the 
mortgagee’s economic concerns remain a priority. However, if one digs a little deeper, one 
can begin to identify significant variation in the two processes and nuance in the language 
used.  
 
First, as noted above, the AJA 1970 is based entirely on an ‘if you can pay, you can stay’ 
approach with possession determined solely by what the borrower can afford. The CCA 
1974, however, is based on what is just, taking into account the interests and positions of both 
                                                          
114 First National Bank v Syed [1991] 2 All ER 250 CA (Civ Div) and Southern & District Finance Plc v 
Barnes, J & J Securities Ltd v Ewart, and Equity Homes Loans Ltd v Lewis (1995) 27 HLR 691, CA. 
115 First National Bank v Syed [1991] 2 All ER 250 CA (Civ Div). 
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parties including the means of the mortgagor.116 As Dunn argues, ‘this is the correct approach 
to an area in need of pliancy.’117 This has potential therefore to allow for the inclusion of 
non-economic concerns and for both to be weighed against each other.  
 
Second, research suggests that the ‘reasonable period’ under the AJA 1970 rarely extends to 
the ‘remaining term of the mortgage’118 for a number of reasons, not least that the judiciary’s 
concern to ensure that the mortgagee does not have to wait for a disproportionately long time 
for contractually agreed payments to be honoured.119 However, under the CCA 1974, ‘the 
court retains a wide discretion in deciding the period of repayment – not being limited to [a] 
reasonable period as under the AJA provisions.’120  
 
Finally, under the AJA 1970 the court does not have the ability to alter the interest rate 
charged under the agreement, whereas under the CCA 1974, such a power exists and has 
been exercised on occasion so as to reduce the interest rate to nil.121 The more expansive 
nature of the CCA 1974 discretion compared to that offered by the AJA 1970 is highlighted 
by McMurtry who notes that, ‘the attraction and flexibility of time orders under the 2006 
consumerist code stands in marked contrast to the limited statutory relief against possession 
afforded to the mortgagor under s. 36 of the Administration of Justice Act 1970.’122 There is 
potential therefore for mortgagors who would not qualify for relief under the AJA 1970 to 
                                                          
116 A. Dunn, ‘”Footprints on the sands of time”: sections 129 and 136 Consumer Credit Act 1974’, (1996) Conv 
209, 212. 
117 Ibid 216. 
118 Cheltenham and Gloucester Building Society v Norgan [1996] 1 All ER 449, at 458C. 
119 L. Whitehouse, ‘A Longitudinal Analysis of the Mortgage Repossession Process 1995-2010: Stability, 
Regulation and Reform’ in S. Bright (Ed.), Modern Studies in Property Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2011) 
151-174 and L. Whitehouse, ‘The Malleability of the Law of Mortgage’ in C. Twigg-Flesner & G. Villalta-Puig 
(Eds.), The Boundaries of Commercial and Trade Law (Munich: Sellier, 2011) 51-74. 
120 Dunn, n 116, text to fn 17. 
121 Equity Homes Loans Ltd v Lewis (1995) 27 HLR 691, CA. 
122 McMurtry, n 1 above, 108-109. 
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avail themselves of a time order by indicating an ability to repay the debt over a longer period 
and at a lower rate of interest.  
 
To highlight the differences in the two approaches we can look again to the case of Green. 
There were, for example, a number of factors that might have been considered in determining 
whether it was ‘just’ to make an order, taking into account the interests of both parties. Such 
factors might have included that the reason for the arrears derived from the mortgagor’s 
disability and that possession arose in part from the mortgagee’s refusal to convert the 
mortgage to interest only. Unlike the majority of possession hearings, the mortgagor in Green 
raised a defence to the mortgagee’s claim on the basis that the refusal to convert to interest 
only amounted to unlawful discrimination under the DDA 1995123 and the EA 2010124. 
Defences to a claim for possession are rare given that they are limited to situations in which 
the mortgage contract can be shown to be unlawful or unenforceable, for example, where 
fraud or undue influence was used to secure the agreement of the mortgagor. The position is 
different, however, in relation to the DDA 1995 and EA 2010. Claims arising under these 
provisions do constitute a defence to possession claims for the reason that, as Lord Bingham 
of Cornhill explains, ‘Parliament has enacted that discriminatory acts... are unlawful. The 
courts cannot be required to give legal effect to acts proscribed as unlawful. But I would not 
expect such a defence, in this field, to be made out very often.’125  
 
The main question here was whether the mortgagee should have taken into consideration the 
mortgagor’s request to change the mortgage from repayment to interest only before starting 
                                                          
123 ss 19(1)(b) and 20(2). 
124 ss 15, 19 and 21. 
125 Lewisham LBC v Malcolm [2008] UKHL 43 at [19]. See also Akerman-Livingstone v Aster Communities Ltd 
[2015] UKSC 15 at [17] per Lady Hale. 
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possession proceedings.126 Unusually, the mortgagor had been awarded payments by the 
Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) that were sufficient to cover the interest payments 
(and more) so, as the judge noted, ‘had the mortgage been changed to an interest only 
mortgage, the Defendant would have been able to meet the interest payments and paid off the 
arrears over a relatively short period of time.’127 In questioning whether the mortgagee was 
allowed to convert the mortgage the judge offers a summary of the mortgage lending industry 
noting that the original loan was taken out at time when there existed ‘a much laxer attitude 
towards lending.’128 Having considered regulatory requirements including MCOB129 the 
judge concluded that it had been open to the mortgagee to convert the mortgagor’s loan to an 
interest only mortgage. 
 
As regards the mortgagor’s claim in respect of disability discrimination, by virtue of s. 20 of 
the DDA 1995, a provider of services (which includes mortgage lenders)130 discriminates 
against a disabled person if for a reason which relates to the disabled person's disability, he 
treats him less favourably than he treats or would treat others to whom that reason does not or 
would not apply and he cannot show that the treatment in question is justified. After 1 
October 2010 this was replaced by section 15 of the EA 2010 which states that a service 
provider is said to discriminate against a ‘disabled’131 person if they treat the disabled person 
unfavourably because of something arising in consequence of the disability, and the service 
provider cannot show that the treatment is a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate 
                                                          
126 Southern Pacific Mortgage Limited v Jacqueline Vera Green 2015 WL 7692940, para 17. 
127 Southern Pacific Mortgage Limited v Jacqueline Vera Green 2015 WL 7692940, para 15. 
128 Southern Pacific Mortgage Limited v Jacqueline Vera Green 2015 WL 7692940, para 5. 
129 MCOB 13.3.4A. 
130 The DDA 1995 and EA 2010 apply to the providers of goods and services whether in the private or public 
sector and hence mortgage lenders are included within that definition. See for example the Equality Act 2010, s 
29.  
131 Defined in Equality Act 2010, s 6. 
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aim.132 The section does not apply if the service provider did not know, and could not 
reasonably have been expected to know, that the individual had the disability. 
 
As regards the decision to commence possession proceedings, undertaken in March 2009, the 
judge found that the defendant was not discriminated unlawfully against as she had been 
treated in the same manner as any other individual in arrears. The judge relied on Lewisham 
LBC v Malcolm133 where it was held that the defendant had not been discriminated against as 
he had been treated in exactly the same manner as any other tenant who had sublet his 
accommodation. The fact that the tenant had sublet his accommodation as a result of his 
mental health difficulties had not swayed the court.  
 
Here it must be assumed that the judge was treating the commencement of proceedings as a 
‘one off’ event that took place before the introduction of the EA 2010. However, the 
treatment received by the mortgagor (i.e. the continued threat of possession) continued well 
beyond the introduction of the EA 2010. According to the transitional arrangements 
governing the introduction of the EA 2010, provided the act in question would have been 
considered unlawful under the DDA 1995 and it continues on or after 1st October 2010 and is 
considered unlawful under the 2010 Act then the EA 2010 applies.134 This is extremely 
significant in this case for the reason that the case of Malcolm was later the subject of 
criticism as it had effectively rendered 'disability-related discrimination' useless.135 In 
response, section 15 of the EA 2010 was introduced so as to reverse the decision and remedy 
                                                          
132 See Akerman-Livingstone v Aster Communities Ltd [2015] UKSC 15. 
133 [2008] UKHL 43 
134 The Equality Act 2010 (Commencement No. 4, Savings, Consequential, Transitional, Transitory and 
Incidental Provisions and Revocation) Order 2010, s 7. 
135 D. Cabrelli, Employment Law in Context (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 2016) 499. 
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the problems caused by it by removing the need for a comparator. The judge in Green 
muddies the waters somewhat by claiming that ‘there is no real difference in the effect of the 
statutes in the facts of this case’136 but according to section 15 of the EA 2010, the key issue 
is not whether the defendant had been treated in the same manner as any other individual in 
arrears but rather whether she was treated unfavourably because of something arising in 
consequence of the disability. As Lady Hale made clear in Akerman-Livingstone v Aster 
Communities Ltd, ‘there was no need for a comparison with how [the provider] would treat 
any other person; [the provider] might have to behave differently towards a disabled tenant 
from the way in which it would behave towards a non-disabled tenant.’137  
 
By virtue of the EA 2010, the first question to be answered is whether the claim for 
possession is ‘because of something arising in consequence of the disability’. Here it may 
have been argued that the mortgagor’s mental health issues had led to an inability to work 
which in turn had led to default and hence possession. The next step would have been to 
question whether the mortgagee could show that the unfavourable treatment was a 
proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim.138 Given the mortgagee could have 
converted the mortgage to interest only thereby receiving payment while avoiding the need 
for possession it may have proven difficult to argue that possession was proportionate. The 
judge, however, considered the commencement of proceedings in March 2009 under the 
DDA 1995 and not the EA 2010. Given the ongoing nature of the action, with the court 
hearing not taking place until November 2015, it seems reasonable to argue that the judge 
could have applied section 15 of the EA 2010 instead. Had she done so, she may have 
                                                          
136 Southern Pacific Mortgage Limited v Jacqueline Vera Green 2015 WL 7692940, para 55. 
137 [2015] UKSC 15 at [18]. 
138 Guidance on determining this issue was provided by Lord Wilson in Akerman-Livingstone v Aster 
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answered the first question in the affirmative and then gone on to seek an answer to the 
second question. 
 
The judge does consider the request to change to an interest only mortgage to be an ongoing 
event and so considers whether it is was unlawful under the old DDA 1995 and if so, whether 
it would be unlawful under the new EA 2010. The question came down to whether the 
mortgagee’s refusal to convert the mortgage to interest only was a breach of the duty to make 
reasonable adjustments.139 The judge held that it was not and this therefore rendered the EA 
2010 inapplicable. The judge’s reasoning was that a repayment mortgage was fundamentally 
different to an interest only one and hence, by virtue of section 21(6) of the DDA 1995, the 
mortgagee was not be required to make reasonable adjustments that would alter 
fundamentally the nature of its business. The judge held that, ‘it would mean imposing on the 
lender a riskier, more unsatisfactory repayment vehicle’140 and cautioned mortgagees against 
engaging in such practices, ‘it is not good practice to lend on an interest only basis.’141 This 
caution reflects the practice since 2008 when the number of interest only mortgages dropped 
dramatically.142 However, it has come too late for the 1.7 million mortgagors who currently 
have an interest only mortgage143 and does not appear to be being heeded by mortgagees 
given evidence to suggest that these products are making a come-back.144  
 
                                                          
139 Disability Discrimination Act 1995, s 21. 
140 Southern Pacific Mortgage Limited v Jacqueline Vera Green 2015 WL 7692940, para 70. 
141 Southern Pacific Mortgage Limited v Jacqueline Vera Green 2015 WL 7692940, para 71. 
142 S. Read, ‘Interest-only mortgages return to give more flexibility to borrowers’ (26 June 2015) The 
Independent. 
143 Council of Mortgage Lenders, ‘Interest-Only: Taking Stock’ (May 2016) at 
https://www.cml.org.uk/news/news-and-views/interest-only-taking-stock/ (last visited 7 May 2019). 
144 H. Thomas, ‘Interest-only mortgages are back, but you have to be wealthy to get one’ (12 October 2015) The 
Guardian. By virtue of MCOB 11.6.41R mortgagees are allowed to sell interest only mortgages on the basis of 
stringent affordability checks. 
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The Court of Appeal, despite being highly critical of the mortgagee’s approach,145 dismissed 
the mortgagor’s appeal, finding that the mortgagee’s blanket refusal to convert any of its 
existing repayment mortgages to interest only mortgages did not make it impossible or 
unreasonably difficult for disabled people to access the service (when compared to the access 
offered to other members of the public).146 In effect, the fact that the mortgagee treated all of 
its customers in an equally unfair manner by refusing to consider a conversion to interest 
only, despite an obligation to do so under the regulatory framework,147 meant that it could not 
be held to be in breach of the DDA 1995. However, as noted above, Akerman makes it clear 
that it is inappropriate when applying s. 15 of the EA 2010 to compare the treatment received 
by a disabled person with the treatment received by a non-disabled person. Interestingly, 
however, the Court of Appeal heard arguments based exclusively on the 1995 Act, noting that 
‘it is common ground that there is no meaningful difference for these purposes between the 
relevant provisions of the 1995 Act and those of the 2010 Act.’148 I would, for the reason 
noted above, beg to differ. 
 
C. Would the decision have been different under the CCA 1974? 
 
During her deliberations, the County Court judge offered a practical example of the 
‘difficulty of weighing incommensurable interests.’149 In relation to the mortgagor the judge 
noted that,  
                                                          
145 See Lord Justice Jackson’s opinion, Green v Southern Pacific Mortgage Ltd & Anor [2018] EWCA Civ 854 
at [85 - 97]. 
146 Green v Southern Pacific Mortgage Ltd & Anor [2018] EWCA Civ 854 at [53]. 
147 Green v Southern Pacific Mortgage Ltd & Anor [2018] EWCA Civ 854 at [72]. 
148 Green v Southern Pacific Mortgage Ltd & Anor [2018] EWCA Civ 854 at [4]. 




she would lose the house that she has occupied for a long time, over 20 years, and the 
loss of her home would clearly be distressing and stressful for her, with a concomitant 
exacerbation of her mental health problems. She would also lose the chance to recover 
from her depression in her own home without the stress of losing that home.150 
 
As regards the mortgagee’s claim, however, the judge argued that the right to enforce one’s 
security is legitimate and that, ‘the need for a properly regulated, but at the same time widely 
available, mortgage market, needs no spelling out.’151 Having rejected the discrimination 
claim, however, the judge was obliged to consider only whether the mortgagor could repay 
any sums due within a reasonable period. As she could not do so, the judge was obliged to 
grant possession. Had this case been heard under the CCA 1974 however, the judge would 
have been able to consider whether it was ‘just’ to grant the mortgagor more time to repay the 
loan at a much reduced rate of interest or to grant any other order she considered just.  
 
In so doing, the court might have been swayed by the fact that the mortgagee had been 
irresponsible in the first instance in granting the loan on a self-certified basis, thus increasing 
the likelihood that the mortgagor would fall into arrears.152 Once in arrears, the mortgagee 
had given no consideration to the defendant’s disability153 and their conduct towards the 
defendant had ‘been unsympathetic in the extreme.’154 It might also have mattered that the 
                                                          
150 Southern Pacific Mortgage Limited v Jacqueline Vera Green 2015 WL 7692940, para 45. 
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reason for the arrears derived from the defendant’s disability, that possession could have been 
avoided had the mortgagee acceded to the request to transfer to interest only and that the 
mortgagee had continually denied that the mortgagor was disabled.155 On these facts, the 
court might have been able to offer the mortgagor some means of avoiding possession by 
allowing her more time to pay at a reduced rate of interest (while also reducing the 
mortgagee’s claim of £269,000 for legal costs by finding that they were not ‘reasonable 
incurred’).156 
 
C. The AJA 1970 or the CCA 1974? 
 
This account of Green demonstrates that the CCA 1974 should be preferred over and above 
the AJA 1970 for three reasons. The first is that had the case been heard under the CCA 1974, 
the mortgagor’s disability might not have been rendered irrelevant to the outcome of the case 
and she might not have been placed in exactly the same position as any other mortgagor, 
regardless of the low level of resilience she exhibited. Second, it demonstrates that the AJA 
process has the potential to undermine a mortgagor’s resilience in avoiding loss of home. 
Evidence submitted by a medical practitioner to the court in Green, for example, suggested 
that ‘the threat of and prosecution of, the possession proceedings has had a significant effect 
on the Defendant’s mental state’157 while the judge noted that the defendant ‘has found the 
proceedings more stressful than they needed to be. The evidence shows that there has been 
deterioration in her mental health.’158 Finally, the AJA 1970 process exhibits bias towards the 
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economic interests of the mortgagee leading to the conclusion that the process is inadequate 
in realigning the inherently unequal relationship between creditor and debtor.159  
 
It is for these reasons that, according to Fineman, reform of the possession process is justified 
for the (responsive) state has a responsibility to adjust societal institutions if they function in 
‘ways harmful to individuals and society’.160 While it is unrealistic to suggest that a 
mortgagee should be prevented from enforcing the security in all cases involving the 
possession of a home occupied by the mortgagor, it seems equally unrealistic and 
unreasonable to allow for such in cases where the mortgagee is in any way causally 
responsible for the arrears. What is needed, therefore, is a process that allows for the 
consideration of the interests, conduct and resilience of both parties. This article argues that 
the CCA 1974 offers such an alternative. Unfortunately, as the following section attests, 
significant barriers stand in the way of its application and practical usefulness. 
 
B. The limits of the CCA 1974 process 
 
Unfortunately, anyone holding out hope that the Treasury’s confirmation, that time orders 
continue to apply to all forms of mortgage, will lead to (what were previously known as) first 
mortgagors experiencing a radical improvement in their chances of avoiding possession will 
be sadly disappointed. Despite efforts in 2006 to reinvigorate a process that was being 
chronically under used,161 time orders appear to remain few and far between.162 A 
                                                          
159 Fineman, n 8 above. 
160 Fineman, n 64 above, 25. 
161 The CCA 2006 was designed to iron out some of the difficulties in using the time order process, see 
McMurtry, n 1 above. 
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combination of a lack of knowledge among mortgagors of the availability of time orders163 
and a restrictive approach to statutory interpretation appear to have ‘contributed to the 
infrequent use of time orders.’164 This situation will not be assisted by the recent reforms 
implemented by the FCA. It would seem, in particular, that time orders can now only be 
sought after the mortgagee has initiated possession proceedings.165 This removes one of the 
reforms implemented by the Consumer Credit Act 2006 (CCA 2006) which was designed to 
increase the use of time orders by enabling second mortgagors to seek more time to repay 
their debts before their level of indebtedness made such a request futile, that is, upon receipt 
of a notice of sums in arrears.166 These provisions are not now available as default notices 
and a notice of sums in arrears do not apply under the RMC regime.167 The implication 
therefore must be that for some mortgagors, the ability to apply for a time order will simply 
come too late, particularly given the clear indication by the Court of Appeal in First National 
Bank v Syed,168 that the discretion available under the CCA 1974 will not be available where 
mortgagor’s financial circumstances cannot support the repayments necessary to clear the 
debt by instalments.  
 
According to the FCA, however, the impact of these changes is reduced by the application 
and operation of MCOB which, in their view, means that, ‘consumers should not need to rely 
on time orders to agree forbearance with the lender.’169 Evidence suggests that the FCA may 
be overstating the extent to which MCOB constrains the arrears management practices of 
                                                          
163 Director General of Fair Trading v First National Bank [2001] UKHL 52 at 23 per Lord Bingham and 
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mortgagees;170 it certainly did not assist the mortgagor in Green. Recently, for example, the 
FCA identified 750,000 customers who had been subject to ‘automatic capitalisation’171 
leading to fees being imposed inappropriately and arrears taking longer to repay. This means 
that time orders remain a necessary failsafe to protect mortgagors where forbearance cannot 
be agreed but as noted above, the change in the timing as to when an order can be requested 
means that they are now of more limited effect. 
 
A. Proposals for reform 
 
In order for the CCA 1974 process to reach its full potential, it is not necessary for formal 
reform processes to be invoked, other than to reverse the timing as to when a time order can 
be applied for. Rather, a programme of measures which inform, cajole and nudge should be 
sufficient to effect change. The first step in initiating this shift needs to come from the FCA 
and the FOS. A programme designed to ‘educate’ mortgagors, legal practitioners and debt 
advisors of the availability and benefits of seeking a time order under the CCA 1974 is 
needed. Fundamental revision of the ‘defence form’172 is also required as it currently advises 
mortgagors that they may only apply for a time order ‘if the loan secured by the mortgage (or 
part of it) is a regulated consumer credit agreement’.173 
 
                                                          
170 See, for example, FCA, Complaints Data Analysis: 2017 H1 at 
https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/data/complaints-data-analysis-2017-h1.pdf (last visited 7 May 2019) and 
Financial Ombudsman Service, ‘Ombudsman News’ at http://www.financial-
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Second, the judiciary need to be encouraged to flex their judicial muscle by employing the 
wider discretion afforded to them so as to take account of and redress the imbalance in the 
resilience of the parties involved. As McMurtry notes, the effectiveness of measures such as 
the CCA 1974 depends upon ‘the extent to which they are utilised by the courts.’174 It 
remains open therefore for the judiciary to consider factors (such as the social interests of the 
mortgagor) and to implement measures (such as extending the mortgage term or reducing 
interest rates) which would not be available to them to the same extent under the AJA 1970. 
 
The consideration of issues beyond the economic is not unheard of within loss of home cases. 
The judiciary will, for example, be familiar with the process regarding possession claims in 
respect of social tenants in England who are in rent arrears. In such cases, the court must 
consider all relevant factors in determining whether it is reasonable to order possession.175 
Similarly, by virtue of the Renting Home (Wales) Act 2016 the court must consider the 
probable effect of the decision on the occupier (and on any permitted occupiers of the 
dwelling)176 and on the landlord’s interests, including their financial interests.177 It does not 
seem too great a leap therefore to propose that judges consider these and other relevant issues 




This article has sought to highlight and some might argue exploit what appears to be an 
unremarked and possibly unintended consequence of the recent reform of mortgage 
                                                          
174 McMurtry, n 1 above, 125. 
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regulation. The reclassification of second mortgages as RMCs and confirmation that the time 
order process remains available in respect of all mortgages opens up the possibility of 
possession cases being heard under either the AJA 1970 or the CCA 1974. In making the case 
for the rejection of the former in favour of the latter this article has revealed that the AJA 
1970 process demonstrates a clear preference for protecting the economic interests of the 
mortgagee to the disadvantage of the mortgagor. It does so by focusing solely on the ability 
of the mortgagor to repay the debt. Other non-economic concerns such as the unethical 
behaviour of mortgagees, the unique impact of loss of ‘home’178 or the adverse impact of 
such on health179 simply do not feature. It is the more expansive discretion given to judges 
under the CCA 1974 that offers an opportunity for the consideration of these social interests. 
It is possible, therefore, that a mortgagor who has suffered bereavement, ill health, 
relationship breakdown and/or been exposed to unethical practices at the hands of their 
mortgagee, and who would fail the affordability test under the AJA 1970, might be able to 
convince the court to exercise its discretion under the CCA 1974. 
 
These changes it is argued have the potential to temper the ‘privilege and favour’180 conferred 
on mortgagees by the AJA 1970, to make mortgagor and mortgagee interests commensurate 
and ultimately to offer a more proportionate and appropriate response to the differing levels 
of risk and resilience experienced by mortgagors and mortgagees. This cultural shift in 
judicial practice may offend against the rational tendencies of land law,181 but it is absolutely 
necessary in order to reduce harm and enhance resilience. 
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